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BS EN 61784-3:2016

BS EN 61784-3:2016

$215.11

Industrial communication networks. Profiles – Functional safety fieldbuses. General rules and profile definitions

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
BSI 2016 86
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This part of the IEC 61784‑3 series explains some common principles that can be used in the transmission of safety-relevant messages among participants within a distributed network which use fieldbus technology in accordance with the requirements of IEC 61508 series 1 for functional safety. These principles are based on the black channel approach. They can be used in various industrial applications such as process control, manufacturing automation and machinery.

This part 2 and the IEC 61784‑3‑x parts specify several functional safety communication profiles based on the communication profiles and protocol layers of the fieldbus technologies in IEC 61784‑1 , IEC 61784‑2 and the IEC 61158 series. These functional safety communication profiles use the black channel approach, as defined in IEC 61508 . These functional safety communication profiles are intended for implementation in safety devices exclusively.

NOTE 1

Other safety-related communication systems meeting the requirements of IEC 61508 series can exist that are not included in this standard.

NOTE 2

It does not cover electrical safety and intrinsic safety aspects. Electrical safety relates to hazards such as electrical shock. Intrinsic safety relates to hazards associated with potentially explosive atmospheres.

All systems are exposed to unauthorized access at some point of their life cycle. Additional measures need to be considered in any safety-related application to protect fieldbus systems against unauthorized access. The IEC 62443 series will address many of these issues; the relationship with the IEC 62443 series is detailed in a dedicated subclause of this part.

NOTE 3

Additional profile specific requirements for security can also be specified in IEC 61784‑4 3 .

NOTE 4

Implementation of a functional safety communication profile according to this part in a device is not sufficient to qualify it as a safety device, as defined in IEC 61508 series.

NOTE 5

The resulting SIL claim of a system depends on the implementation of the selected functional safety communication profile within this system.

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
4 European foreword
Endorsement notice
6 Annex ZA (normative) Normative references to international publications with their corresponding European publications
9 English
CONTENTS
14 FOREWORD
16 0 Introduction
0.1 General
Figures
Figure 1 – Relationships of IEC 61784-3 with other standards (machinery)
17 Figure 2 – Relationships of IEC 61784-3 with other standards (process)
18 0.2 Transition from Edition 2 to extended assessment methods in Edition 3
Figure 3 – Transition from Edition 2 to Edition 3 assessment methods
19 0.3 Patent declaration
20 1 Scope
2 Normative references
22 3 Terms, definitions, symbols, abbreviated terms and conventions
3.1 Terms and definitions
29 3.2 Symbols and abbreviated terms
30 4 Conformance
5 Basics of safety-related fieldbus systems
5.1 Safety function decomposition
31 5.2 Communication system
5.2.1 General
5.2.2 IEC 61158 fieldbuses
Figure 4 – Safety communication as a part of a safety function
32 5.2.3 Communication channel types
5.2.4 Safety function response time
Figure 5 – Example model of a functional safety communication system
33 5.3 Communication errors
5.3.1 General
5.3.2 Corruption
5.3.3 Unintended repetition
5.3.4 Incorrect sequence
Figure 6 – Example of safety function response time components
34 5.3.5 Loss
5.3.6 Unacceptable delay
5.3.7 Insertion
5.3.8 Masquerade
5.3.9 Addressing
5.4 Deterministic remedial measures
5.4.1 General
5.4.2 Sequence number
5.4.3 Time stamp
35 5.4.4 Time expectation
5.4.5 Connection authentication
5.4.6 Feedback message
5.4.7 Data integrity assurance
5.4.8 Redundancy with cross checking
36 5.4.9 Different data integrity assurance systems
5.5 Typical relationships between errors and safety measures
37 5.6 Communication phases
Tables
Table 1 – Overview of the effectiveness ofthe various measures on the possible errors
38 5.7 FSCP implementation aspects
5.8 Data integrity considerations
5.8.1 Calculation of the residual error rate
Figure 7 – Conceptual FSCP protocol model
Figure 8 – FSCP implementation aspects
39 Table 2 – Definition of items used for calculation of the residual error rates
40 5.8.2 Total residual error rate and SIL
Figure 9 – Example application 1 (m=4)
Figure 10 – Example application 2 (m = 2)
41 5.9 Relationship between functional safety and security
Table 3 – Typical relationship of residual error rate to SIL
Table 4 – Typical relationship of residual error on demand to SIL
42 5.10 Boundary conditions and constraints
5.10.1 Electrical safety
5.10.2 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
Figure 11 – Zones and conduits concept for security according to IEC 62443
43 5.11 Installation guidelines
5.12 Safety manual
5.13 Safety policy
44 6 Communication Profile Family 1 (Foundation™ Fieldbus) – Profiles for functional safety
7 Communication Profile Family 2 (CIP™) and Family 16 (SERCOS®) – Profiles for functional safety
8 Communication Profile Family 3 (PROFIBUS™, PROFINET™) – Profiles for functional safety
45 9 Communication Profile Family 6 (INTERBUS®) – Profiles for functional safety
10 Communication Profile Family 8 (CC-Link™) – Profiles for functional safety
10.1 Functional Safety Communication Profile 8/1
Table 5 – Overview of profile identifier usable for FSCP 6/7
46 10.2 Functional Safety Communication Profile 8/2
11 Communication Profile Family 12 (EtherCAT™) – Profiles for functional safety
47 12 Communication Profile Family 13 (Ethernet POWERLINK™) – Profiles for functional safety
13 Communication Profile Family 14 (EPA®) – Profiles for functional safety
14 Communication Profile Family 17 (RAPIEnet™) – Profiles for functional safety
48 15 Communication Profile Family 18 (SafetyNET p™ Fieldbus) – Profiles for functional safety
49 Annex A (informative) Example functional safety communication models
A.1 General
A.2 Model A (single message, channel and FAL, redundant SCLs)
A.3 Model B (full redundancy)
Figure A.1 – Model A
50 A.4 Model C (redundant messages, FALs and SCLs, single channel)
A.5 Model D (redundant messages and SCLs, single channel and FAL)
Figure A.2 – Model B
Figure A.3 – Model C
51 Figure A.4 – Model D
52 Annex B (normative) Safety communication channel model using CRC-based error checking
B.1 Overview
B.2 Channel model for calculations
Figure B.1 – Communication channel with perturbation
53 B.3 Bit error probability Pe
Figure B.2 – Binary symmetric channel (BSC)
54 B.4 Cyclic redundancy checking
B.4.1 General
Figure B.3 – Example of a block with a message part and a CRC signature
55 B.4.2 Considerations concerning CRC polynomials
Figure B.4 – Block codes for error detection
Table B.1 – Example dependency dmin and block bit length n
56 Figure B.5 – Proper and improper CRC polynomials
57 Annex C (informative) Structure of technology-specific parts
Table C.1 – Common subclause structure for technology-specific parts
59 Annex D (informative) Assessment guideline
D.1 Overview
D.2 Channel types
D.2.1 General
D.2.2 Black channel
D.2.3 White channel
60 D.3 Data integrity considerations for white channel approaches
D.3.1 General
D.3.2 Models B and C
61 D.3.3 Models A and D
Figure D.1 – Basic Markov model
62 D.4 Verification of safety measures
D.4.1 General
D.4.2 Implementation
D.4.3 “De-energize to trip” principle
D.4.4 Safe state
D.4.5 Transmission errors
D.4.6 Safety reaction and response times
63 D.4.7 Combination of measures
D.4.8 Absence of interference
D.4.9 Additional fault causes (white channel)
D.4.10 Reference test beds and operational conditions
D.4.11 Conformance tester
64 Annex E (informative) Examples of implicit vs. explicit FSCP safety measures
E.1 General
E.2 Example fieldbus message with safety PDUs
E.3 Model with completely explicit safety measures
Figure E.1 – Example safety PDUs embedded in a fieldbus message
Figure E.2 – Model with completely explicit safety measures
65 E.4 Model with explicit A-code and implicit T-code safety measures
E.5 Model with explicit T-code and implicit A-code safety measures
Figure E.3 – Model with explicit A-code and implicit T-code safety measures
66 E.6 Model with split explicit and implicit safety measures
Figure E.4 – Model with explicit T-code and implicit A-code safety measures
Figure E.5 – Model with split explicit and implicit safety measures
67 E.7 Model with completely implicit safety measures
E.8 Addition to Annex B – impact of implicit codes on properness
Figure E.6 – Model with completely implicit safety measures
68 Annex F (informative) Extended models for estimation of the total residual error rate
F.1 Applicability
F.2 General models for black channel communications
Figure F.1 – Black channel from an FSCP perspective
69 F.3 Identification of generic safety properties
F.4 Assumptions for residual error rate calculations
70 F.5 Residual error rates
F.5.1 Explicit and implicit mechanisms
F.5.2 Residual error rate calculations
72 F.6 Data integrity
F.6.1 Probabilistic considerations
F.6.2 Deterministic considerations
73 F.7 Authenticity
F.7.1 General
Figure F.2 – Model for authentication considerations
74 F.7.2 Residual error rate for authenticity (RRA)
Figure F.3 – Fieldbus and internal address errors
75 F.8 Timeliness
F.8.1 General
76 Figure F.4 – Example of slowly increasing message latency
77 F.8.2 Residual error rate for timeliness (RRT)
Figure F.5 – Example of an active network element failure
78 F.9 Masquerade
F.9.1 General
F.9.2 Other terms used to calculate residual error rate for masquerade rejection (RRM)
F.10 Calculation of the total residual error rates
F.10.1 Based on the summation of the residual error rates
79 F.10.2 Based on other quantitative proofs
F.11 Total residual error rate and SIL
Figure F.6 – Example application 1 (m = 4)
Figure F.7 – Example application 2 (m = 2)
80 F.12 Configuration and parameterization for an FSCP
F.12.1 General
Table F.1 – Typical relationship of residual error rate to SIL
Table F.2 – Typical relationship of residual error on demand to SIL
81 Figure F.8 – Example of configuration and parameterization procedures for FSCP
82 F.12.2 Configuration and parameterization change rate
F.12.3 Residual error rate for configuration and parameterization
83 Bibliography

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BS EN 61784-3:2016
$215.11