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BS EN 419211-2:2013

BS EN 419211-2:2013

$189.07

Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Device with key generation

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
BSI 2013 46
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This European Standard specifies a protection profile for a secure signature creation device that may generate signing keys internally: secure signature creation device with key generation (SSCD KG).

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
6 1 Scope
2 Normative references
3 Conventions and terminology
3.1 Conventions
3.2 Terms and definitions
4 PP introduction
4.1 PP reference
7 4.2 PP overview
8 4.3 TOE overview
4.3.1 Operation of the TOE
9 4.3.2 Target of evaluation
10 4.3.3 TOE lifecycle
4.3.3.1 General
11 4.3.3.2 Preparation stage
12 4.3.3.3 Operational use stage
13 5 Conformance claims
5.1 CC conformance claim
5.2 PP claim, Package claim
5.3 Conformance rationale
5.4 Conformance statement
6 Security problem definition
6.1 Assets, users and threat agents
14 6.2 Threats
6.2.1 T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying and releasing of the signature creation data
6.2.2 T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature creation data
6.2.3 T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
6.2.4 T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature verification data
6.2.5 T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE
6.2.6 T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS/R
6.2.7 T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature
6.3 Organisational security policies
6.3.1 P.CSP_QCert Qualified certificate
15 6.3.2 P.QSign Qualified electronic signatures
6.3.3 P.Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature creation device
6.3.4 P.Sig_Non-Repud Non-repudiation of signatures
6.4 Assumptions
6.4.1 A.CGA Trustworthy certificate generation application
6.4.2 A.SCA Trustworthy signature creation application
7 Security objectives
7.1 Security objectives for the TOE
7.1.1 Relation to PP SSCD KI
16 7.1.2 OT.Lifecycle_Security Lifecycle security
7.1.3 OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorised SCD/SVD generation
7.1.4 OT.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature creation data
7.1.5 OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD
7.1.6 OT.SCD_Secrecy Secrecy of the signature creation data
7.1.7 OT.Sig_Secure Cryptographic security of the electronic signature
7.1.8 OT.Sigy_SigF Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only
7.1.9 OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE
17 7.1.10 OT.EMSEC_Design Provide physical emanations security
7.1.11 OT.Tamper_ID Tamper detection
7.1.12 OT.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance
7.2 Security objectives for the operational environment
7.2.1 Relation to PP SSCD KI
7.2.2 OE.SVD_Auth Authenticity of the SVD
7.2.3 OE.CGA_QCert Generation of qualified certificates
7.2.4 OE.SSCD_Prov_Service Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD-provisioning service
7.2.5 OE.HID_VAD Protection of the VAD
18 7.2.6 OE.DTBS_Intend SCA sends data intended to be signed
7.2.7 OE.DTBS_Protect SCA protects the data intended to be signed
7.2.8 OE.Signatory Security obligation of the signatory
19 7.3 Security objectives rationale
7.3.1 Security objectives backtracking
7.3.2 Security objectives sufficiency
22 8 Extended components definition
23 9 Security requirements
9.1 Security functional requirements
9.1.1 Use of requirement specifications
9.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
24 9.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
9.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
9.1.2.3 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
25 9.1.3 User data protection (FDP)
9.1.3.1 FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Subset access control
9.1.3.2 FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Security attribute based access control
26 9.1.3.3 FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer Subset access control
9.1.3.4 FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer Security attribute based access control
28 9.1.3.5 FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation Subset access control
9.1.3.6 FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation Security attribute based access control
29 9.1.3.7 FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
9.1.3.8 FDP_SDI.2/Persistent Stored data integrity monitoring and action
30 9.1.3.9 FDP_SDI.2/DTBS Stored data integrity monitoring and action
9.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)
9.1.4.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
31 9.1.4.2 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
9.1.4.3 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
32 9.1.5 Security management (FMT)
9.1.5.1 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
9.1.5.2 FMT_SMF.1 Security management functions
9.1.5.3 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
33 9.1.5.4 FMT_MSA.1/Admin Management of security attributes
9.1.5.5 FMT_MSA.1/Signatory Management of security attributes
9.1.5.6 FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
34 9.1.5.7 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
9.1.5.8 FMT_MSA.4 Security attribute value inheritance
9.1.5.9 FMT_MTD.1/Admin Management of TSF data
35 9.1.5.10 FMT_MTD.1/Signatory Management of TSF data
9.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
9.1.6.1 FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
9.1.6.2 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
36 9.1.6.3 FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
9.1.6.4 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
9.1.6.5 FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
37 9.2 Security assurance requirements
38 9.3 Security requirements rationale
9.3.1 Security requirement coverage
39 9.3.2 TOE Security Requirements Sufficiency
41 9.3.3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security requirements
42 9.3.4 Rationale for chosen security assurance requirements

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BS EN 419211-2:2013
$189.07